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ABSTRACT 
External Effects of Currency Unions 
by Thomas Plümper and Vera E. Troeger ∗ 
Argument: The paper argues that the introduction of the Euro has considerably 
reduced de facto monetary policy autonomy in non-ECU members.  
We start from a simple Mundellian model, in which currency unions raise eco-
nomic efficiency but reduce monetary policy autonomy. Our main argument 
holds that governments in countries that did not join the currency union lose 
monetary policy autonomy if the establishment of a currency union increases 
the size of the key currency area. The increase in the size of the key currency 
area has two external effects on countries remaining outside the currency 
union: Firstly, it renders stable exchange-rates to the currency union slightly 
more important, because the value of goods imported from countries within the 
currency union increases and because the countries inside the union have more 
synchronized business cycles. Secondly and more importantly, we claim that 
any given change in the real interest-rate differential leads to an exchange-rate 
effect, which is larger the smaller the domestic currency area is relative to the 
key currency area. Consequently, governments in non-member countries have 
to pay a higher price if they seek to stimulate the domestic economy.   
Hypotheses: a) Exchange-rate effects on changes in the real interest rate 
differential are larger, if currency areas are less equal in size. b) Outsider 
countries more closely follow the interest-rate policy of the currency union than 
they had previously followed the monetary policy of the anchor currency. 
Empirics: We employ a panel-GARCH model to estimate the impact of changes 
in the key currency real interest rate on the real interest rate of other countries. 
Specifically, we analyze the influence of Germany’s and the Eurozone’s 
monetary policy on the monetary policy of Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, and Switzerland.  
Results: Our results support the assumptions underlying our model as well as 
our main argument. De facto monetary autonomy of countries remaining outside 
a currency union declines with the establishment of the union. 
 
 
Keywords: Interest Rates, Monetary Policy Autonomy, Currency Unions, Bundesbank, 
European Central Bank 
JEL Classification: E5, N1 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Externe Auswirkungen von Währungsunionen 
 
Der Artikel argumentiert, dass die Einführung des Euro die faktische 
geldpolitische Autonomie auch in Staaten reduziert hat, die der Europäischen 
Währungsunion nicht beigetreten sind. Das Argument basiert auf einem 
einfachen Mudellianischen Modell, in dem Währungsunionen die wirtschaftliche 
Effizienz steigern aber zugleich die geldpolitische Autonomie reduzieren. Wir 
zeigen über das Standardmodell hinaus, dass Länder, die der Währungsunion 
nicht beitreten, geldpolitische Autonomie einbüßen, wenn sich durch die 
Währungsunion die Größe des Leitwährungsraumes erhöht. Diese 
Vergrößerung des Leitwährungsraumes hat zwei Auswirkungen auf Länder 
außerhalb der Union: Erstens steigt die Bedeutung stabiler Wechselkurse leicht 
an, weil der Wert importierter Güter aus dem Währungsgebiet zunimmt und weil 
die Länder der Union stärker synchronisierte Konjunkturzyklen aufweisen als 
vor der Gründung der Währungsunion. Zweitens steigt durch die Vergrößerung 
der Leitwährung aber der Einfluss von Veränderungen der Zinsdifferenz auf die 
Wechselkurse zwischen Währungen außerhalb der Währungsunion und der 
Unionswährung an. Folglich müssen Länder eine stärkere Abwertung ihrer 
Währung hinnehmen, wenn sie die Zinsen senken, um die Konjunktur 
anzukurbeln. 
Wir testen dieses Argument anhand der zwei Kernhypothesen: a) 
Wechselkurse reagieren umso stärker auf Veränderungen der Zinsdifferenz, je 
größer der Leitwährungsraum ist. b) Länder außerhalb der Währungsunion 
folgen der Geldpolitik der Union stärker, als sie der Geldpolitik der Leitwährung 
vor Gründung der Union folgten. Wir greifen auf Panel-GARCH Modelle zurück, 
um den Einfluss der Geldpolitik der EZB relativ zum Einfluss der Bundesbank 
auf die Geldpolitik in Großbritannien, der Schweiz, Norwegen, Dänemark und 
Schweden zu testen. Die empirische Analyse bestätigt die aus dem formalen 
Modell abgeleiteten Hypothesen. Die faktische geldpolitische Autonomie der 
Länder außerhalb der Währungsunion sinkt mit deren Etablierung.
 v 
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1. Introduction 
The Euro is back on the political agenda: In the three European Union member 
countries that abstained from joining the European Currency Union (ECU), oppo-
sition against the introduction of the common currency seems to dwindle. After a 
long period of negative public sentiment and reluctance among political parties to 
push forward the issue, the introduction of the Euro in Sweden, Denmark and 
Great Britain has become a possibility.  
Consider Britain, where the political debate has long since been dominated by the 
so-called Brown criteria, formulated by Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer. Just after Labour came into power, Brown defined five criteria for Brit-
ain joining the Euro: Only if a) business cycles synchronize between Britain and 
Euroland, b) the British industry proofs its competitiveness vis-à-vis Europe, c) 
the Euro boosts FDI in Britain, d) the City’s role as a main international financial 
centre can be maintained and e) growth and employment increase, will the UK 
surrender monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt. 
Six years later, Euro-sceptic Brown admitted that – although four of the five crite-
ria have not been met – significant progress in achieving cyclical convergence has 
been made. As a consequence, political front lines gradually vanish while some 
observers already expect a referendum on British EMU membership in 2006 
(Economist June 14, 2003).  
The Euro also brought back the idea of becoming EU member back into the dis-
cussion in Norway and Switzerland. In Norway, a dramatic shift in public opinion 
concerning EU membership has occurred within the last month. While in 2002 
opponents of EU membership held a small majority, a mere 6 months later sup-
porters of Norwegian EU membership are now twice as numerous as their oppo-
nents. One crucial element of the apparent turnaround in the public opinion has 
been the Euro: With an appreciating Krona, the introduction of the Euro became a 
central issue in public political debates. Some politicians not only favour the im-
mediate introduction of the Euro, they also advocate an early introduction of the 
Euro – if necessary even before Norway becomes a full EU member and without 
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being granted voice in the ECB’s board of governors. In other words, Norway 
would “Euroize”.1 
The recent debates in Great Britain and Norway raise questions about what has 
changed since only 12 out of 15 EU members could agree upon the European Cur-
rency Union (ECU). Why does it seem to be a different question whether a group 
of countries should push ahead with the creation of a single currency or whether it 
is in the interest of outsiders to join a currency union once it has come into being? 
Why do countries consider becoming part of Euroland that abstained from doing 
so only a decade before? 
This paper gives an answer to these puzzling questions by analyzing the external 
effects of currency unions. We argue that the Euro gained significance on the po-
litical agenda in non-member countries, because the introduction of the Euro has 
considerably reduced de facto monetary policy autonomy in non-ECU members.  
Since the maintenance of monetary policy autonomy provides a major incentive 
not to join a currency union, the reduction of de facto monetary policy autonomy 
should, ceteris paribus, shift the incentive to join the union upwards.  
We start from a simple Mundellian model, in which currency unions raise eco-
nomic efficiency but reduce monetary policy autonomy. Depending on the gov-
ernments’ relative weights on growth of per capita income and on macroeconomic 
volatility, governments may or may not choose to found a new or join an already 
existing currency union.  
In a nutshell, our main argument contends that governments in countries that did 
not join the currency union, loose monetary policy autonomy if the establishment 
of a currency union increases the size of the key currency area. Why should this 
be the case? We argue that the increase in the size of the key currency area has 
two external effects on countries remaining outside the currency union: Firstly, it 
renders a stable exchange-rate to the currency union slightly more important be-
cause the value of goods imported from countries within the currency union in-
                                                 
1  Eduardo Leyi Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger (2003) dub all instances of countries 
accepting a foreign currency as ‘Dollarization’ – regardless of the currency involved. 
Note, that in only 14 of the 32 cases they report that the Dollar was accepted as sole 
means of payment. 
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creases. This effect should be moderate and cannot be taken as granted because 
trade diversion effects in the union could render the union an even less important 
trading partner for outside countries. Secondly, the business cycle of countries 
within the currency union becomes more synchronized. As a consequence, it may 
become more important for outside countries to bring monetary policy broadly in 
line with the monetary policy of the union taken its won and the union’s business 
cycles as given. Thirdly and probably most importantly, we claim that for any 
given change in the real interest-rate differential (suppose this change is caused by 
active monetary policy) leads to an exchange-rate effect, which is the larger the 
smaller the country is in relation to the key currency area.2 Since the foundation of 
a currency union that is joined by the former key currency inevitably increases the 
size of the key currency area, outside countries get relatively smaller. Conse-
quently, governments in non-member countries have to pay a larger price if they 
seek to stimulate the domestic economy.  
We use a combination of the second and the third effect to explain why outside 
countries more closely follow the interest-rate policy of the currency union than 
they had followed the monetary policy of the previous anchor currency. This 
model is developed in more detail in section 2. Section 3 tests the causal mecha-
nism of the model along with the implications of the model for monetary policy 
autonomy in non-member countries. Our empirical test case is provided by the 
European currency union. Specifically, we analyze the central bank interest rates 
of three EU members who did not sign the European Monetary Union treaty 
(Great Britain, Denmark and Sweden) and the two EFTA countries (Norway and 
Switzerland) to test our hypothesis of an EMU-induced decline in monetary pol-
icy autonomy among non-Euroland countries. Finally, section 4 concludes with a 
broader discussion of the emerging strategic setting and the policy implications of 
our analysis. 
2. The Model 
According to Robert Mundell’s path-breaking model of optimal currency areas 
(Mundell 1961; see also McKinnon 1963 and Kenen 1969), currency unions have 
two opposing consequences: On the one hand, member states benefit because a 
                                                 
2  This logic directly follows from the Metzler diagram (Metzler 1960). 
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joint currency lowers trading costs and thereby generates efficiency gains. The 
credibility of the central bank is enhanced and the country’s risk rating declines. 
On the other hand, a single currency precludes the implementation of independent 
monetary policies. Once a country joins a currency union, monetary policies can 
no longer be tailored to country-specific economic shocks (Mundell 1961, 1965). 
The currency union not only reduces the number of policy instruments available 
to the government, governments also lose their ability to act as lender of last re-
sort, simply because they can no longer print money to provide markets with li-
quidity (Broda and Levy Yeyati 2003).  
With one notable exception, the model developed here follows the logic of Al-
berto Alesina’s and Robert Barro’s recent formalization of the Mundellian model 
of currency unions (Alesina/ Barro 2002). While Alesina and Barro ignore ex-
change-rate effects, our model explicitly accounts for them.  
The intuition of the model captures the idea that the de facto monetary policy 
autonomy of countries remains incomplete even if governments maintain legal 
authority over monetary policy. The idea of non-legal limits to monetary auton-
omy is nothing new in the literature. For instance, Kaminsky and Reinhart claim 
that once a monetary authority has lost its credibility in fighting inflation, it will 
probably face serious difficulties in counterbalancing economic shocks (Kamin-
sky/ Reinhart 1999). In addition, Jay Shambaugh (2004) argues that all countries, 
not just pegged countries and members of a currency union, lack monetary policy 
autonomy. Shambaugh holds that de facto monetary policy autonomy is most re-
stricted in small countries (p. 304), but he also shows that the monetary authorities 
of pegged countries react more quickly to changes in the key currency area’s 
monetary policy (p. 344). Thus, even if the monetary authority is legally unre-
stricted, it faces severe constraints in actually reaching its policy goals. Our analy-
sis takes one step beyond the common wisdom just discussed. We hold that 
monetary authorities face a trade off between stabilizing the exchange-rate and 
moderating the macroeconomic effects of an exogenous demand shock. Monetary 
authorities therefore target two policy goals with one instrument.  
Most importantly, our model makes the case that the resulting trade-off between 
exchange-rate stability and macroeconomic performance is a function of the size 
of the key currency area for two reasons: Firstly, the larger the key currency area, 
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the more intermediate goods are imported from that currency zone. Accordingly, a 
stabilization of the exchange-rate becomes a prerequisite of flourishing trade rela-
tions. Second and more importantly, the change in the difference between the do-
mestic and the foreign real interest rates being equal, an upward shift in the size of 
the currency area potentially leads to larger changes in the bilateral exchange-rate. 
Thus, the larger the key currency area, the more elastically the exchange rate will 
react to changes in the interest rate differential. 
If this assertion is valid (we will test this proposition in the empirical section), the 
establishment of a currency union may shift the political balance between macro-
economic stimulation and exchange-rate stabilization in favor of the latter policy 
goal. If the currency union increases the size of the key currency area, non-mem-
bers partly lose the interest-rate as an instrument to stimulate the economy. Rela-
tively small countries have a larger interest in exchange-rate stability. Hence, de 
facto monetary policy autonomy (the extent to which a monetary authority uses its 
policy instruments to stimulate the economy) decreases with the size of the key 
currency area. The remainder of this section restates this logic within a standard 
model of a currency union. 
 
Modelling Gains from Trade  
Consider a simple economy in which competitive firms produce using a Dixit-
Stiglitz production function (Dixit/ Stiglitz 1977). The output of firm i  is given 
by 
∑
=
−=
N
j
jiii XALy
1
1 αα   ,  10 << α  (1) 
where A>0 measures productivity, iL  is the firm’s employment of labour and jiX  
is the amount of intermediate goods used by firm i . Countries I and II produce 
non-overlapping intermediaries. Domestic and foreign producers of intermediate 
goods do not compete, though both national markets may be competitive. Within 
each country markets are perfect; there are no transportation costs or political 
market distortions. Shipping between the two countries, on the contrary, includes 
transportation costs 10 << b  as a result of distance, costs of hedging against ex-
change rate-risks, use of a different language, dissimilarity in legal systems (stan-
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dards), and cultural heterogeneity.3 These costs reflect the use of resources and are 
sunk.4  
Controlling for mark-up prices of the intermediates αµ /11 ≤≤ j , the absolute 
value of intermediates employed by firm i  in country I is given by 
( )
( )( )[ ] NNjLbAX
NjLAX
I
i
II
ji
I
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I
ji
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)1/(1
)1/(1
+=−=
==
−
−
α
α
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µα
     , (2) 
where INj ,...,1=  denotes the intermediates produced in country I while country 
II produces the intermediates NNj I ,...,1+= . The smaller the trading cost, the 
higher the absolute input of foreign intermediates and the higher the relative share 
of foreign intermediates will be. Small open economies gain more from joining a 
currency union than their larger trading partners because most of their intermedi-
ates are produced abroad.  
At this point, we depart from the Alesina-Barro model (Alesina/ Barro 2002) by 
assuming that mark-up prices result not only from changes in total demand but 
also from exchange-rate effects. In the presence of exchange-rate adjustments, 
mark-up prices differ in country I and II. Specifically, once a government uses 
monetary policy instruments to stimulate the economy and counterbalance exoge-
nous shocks, its currency depreciates vis-à-vis the key currency and hence the 
price of imported goods (measured in the domestic currency) rises.  
Welfare gains from trade are then 
( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 



−−+
−= −−
−
−−
IIIIII
III
I
I
Nb
N
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ααα
α
ααα
µαµ
µαµα
1/)1/(1
)1/(1
)1/()1/(1
1/1
/1
   . (3) 
Welfare gains are maximized if 1=µ  (the mark-up costs of intermediates are 
minimal) and 0=b (there are no international transaction costs). The larger b and 
the larger the price effect of trade, the smaller the welfare gains will be for coun-
try I. Since the costs of a currency union have not yet been dealt with, equation 3 
plausibly suggests that welfare is maximized if the world consisted of only one 
                                                 
3  This list is not meant to be comprehensive. 
4  This economy is a version of that in Alesina/ Barro (2002). 
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country (Alesina/ Barro 2002: 416). However, this conclusion depends on restric-
tive ceteris paribus assumptions that will be relaxed in subsequent sections. Ig-
noring omitted side-effects for the time being, the gross gains from joining a cur-
rency union are  
( )( ) 0/1)1(
1)1(
)1/(1)1/()1/(1)1/()12( >−−−=−∂
∂ −−−−− IIIIIIII NANb
b
C αααααα µαµαα
α   .(4) 
The next section considers the costs of joining a currency union more closely. 
Once these costs are introduced, the optimal number of currencies exceeds one. 
In equation 4 all single components are positive. Thus, the whole term is also 
strictly positive. This suggests that gains from joining a currency union are higher, 
the higher transaction costs of having more than one currency are. Accordingly, 
countries are more likely to form a currency union when exchange-rates are more 
volatile and when it is difficult to find domestic substitutes for imported interme-
diates.  
 
Modelling Gains from Macroeconomic Policy Autonomy  
This subsection analyzes the gains from macroeconomic policy autonomy. We 
employ a standard textbook model of monetary policy,5 where economic agents 
rationally expect the inflation rate eπ , which is a function of the natural rate of 
unemployment and the expected monetary policy ( ) ( )θθππ me Ε=Ε= . θ  stands 
for the natural rate of unemployment, m is monetary policy, and Ε  denotes the 
expectation term.  
Actors adjust their behavior according to all available information. As a natural 
consequence, monetary policy cannot ‘create’ output growth and employment. 
Rather, in the absence of international monetary policy spill-overs monetary au-
thorities have an incentive to set m according to the non-accelerating inflationary 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU). Thus, the optimal monetary policy reduces in-
flation at acceptable levels while at the same time stabilizing the unemployment 
rate. 
                                                 
5  Notation is based on Persson/ Tabellini 2000. 
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Governments can nevertheless stabilize employment by responding to unexpected 
exogenous shocks of sizeε . If a government keeps monetary policy constant in 
the presence of an exogenous shock, unemployment increases while inflation 
remains constant. However, the government can also adjust monetary policy 
according to the exogenous shock, that is, it may reduce the central bank interest 
rate. Thereby, the drop in consumption and the increase in unemployment both are 
minimized, while inflation remains constant because rational agents anticipate a 
reversal of monetary policy once the exogenous shock is over.  
Keeping this in mind, change in consumption follows 
( )( )[ ] II CmmC εθ −Ε−+= 1 ,  (5) 
where ε  is a stochastic element (say: a supply shock of intermediate goods) with 
mean 0 and an unproblematic variance. IC  denotes the consumption rate which is 
reached in the simultaneous absence of exogenous shocks and active monetary 
policies. 
Inserting (5) in (3) gives: 
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where the effects of an unexpected exogenous shock are given by  
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in case the government does not counterbalance the shock. The potential gains 
from monetary policy autonomy are then given by  
( )( )
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Since potential losses in individual consumption are a function of the severity of 
the exogenous shock, governments intervene more strongly into the markets when 
shocks are severe. Perhaps being overly optimistic the model implies that if gov-
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ernments fully offset the consequences of an exogenous shock, individual con-
sumption does not decline at all. In reality, however, governments may not 
completely eliminate the effects of economic shocks, because the use of monetary 
policy pushes up the agents’ interest rate expectation. Following mainstream po-
litical economy (Persson/ Tabellini 2000) and assuming that governments maxi-
mize a quadratic support function ( ) ( )²)²(1 xxS g −−−−−= λππλ , the political 
reaction to a supply shock 0>ε  depends on the value of lambda ( )10 ≥≥ λ .  π  
and x  denote society’s most preferred values of inflation and employment. In the 
absence of capital flows, the optimal monetary policy is ελπ +=optm . 
Due to this trade-off between counterbalancing the economic shock and rising 
inflation expectation, governments do not necessarily annul the effect of exoge-
nous shocks. They also calculate the influence of changes in monetary policy on 
the inflation expectation. Specifically, the more important output and employment 
for the government’s survival in power, the more the government cuts interest 
rates or increases the money supply in reaction to unexpected exogenous shocks.  
The model specification discussed so far brings about some straightforward re-
sults: Firstly, if – say – left wing governments value monetary policy autonomy 
more than their conservative counterparts do, they are less keen to join a monetary 
union. Moreover, the incentive to join a monetary union should decline with the 
societal desire to fight unemployment. And secondly, the less a government can 
commit itself to an anti-inflationary policy, the higher is the incentive to join a 
currency union (Chang/ Velasco 2000). 
Before we turn to discussing the external effects of currency unions, we summa-
rize the predictions made by the model: Countries are more likely to join a cur-
rency union, a) the more their production process relies upon imported intermedi-
ate goods, b) the smaller and more open they are, c) the less efficient financial 
markets cope with exchange-rate risks, d) the more frequent and severe unex-
pected economic shocks are, and e) the more the population values consumption 
relative to low levels of inflation.  
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Gains from monetary policy autonomy in the presence of exchange-rate adjust-
ments 
In the presence of exchange-rate adjustments monetary policy becomes less desir-
able. If the government cuts interest rates, capital outflows intensify and the do-
mestic currency devaluates. The same happens if the government prefers to aug-
ment the money supply: Under this condition, agents expect an increase in the 
inflation rate, which in turn weakens the exchange-rate. Hence, active monetary 
policies raise the price of imported intermediates – thereby inevitably reducing the 
stimulating effects of government intervention. Because smaller countries import 
larger shares of intermediate goods, monetary policy autonomy is least valuable in 
small and open economies. Governments in small countries for these reasons 
place a higher value on avoiding exchange-rate effects and shy away from active 
monetary policy.  
Our main argument holds that the extent of exchange-rate adjustments and there-
fore the mark-up price effect is positively related to the size of the key currency 
area. Since the establishment of a currency union may push the size of the key 
currency area upward (as it happened in Europe after the foundation of the ECU), 
governments shift the political balance between macroeconomic stimulation and 
exchange-rate stabilization in favor of the former policy goal. De facto monetary 
policy autonomy (the extent to which a monetary authority uses its policy instru-
ments to stimulate the economy) decreases with the size of the key currency area. 
To explicitly model the logic of our argument, we let the mark-up price of the 
foreign intermediates partly depend on the monetary policy of country I plus the 
size of country I relative to the size of the key currency area. If the central bank 
untightens domestic monetary policy to offset exogenous shocks the price of for-
eign intermediates rises due to capital outflow and subsequent exchange rate ad-
justments:  
I
II
IIIIII
e
eii ∆−−+= µµ  (9) 
where III ii ,  are the interest rates of country I and II respectively and II
I
e
e∆  de-
note exchange rate adjustments.  
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The price of foreign intermediates increases as the domestic monetary authority 
cuts the interest rate. Governments employing monetary policy instruments do not 
only counterbalance exogenous shocks; they indirectly trigger capital exports. 
This unintended but hardly avoidable side-effect devaluates the domestic currency 
and thereby renders imported intermediates more expensive.  
Equation 11 computes the change in the consumption level of country I as a func-
tion of the mark-up price of intermediaries produced in country II:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )[ ] 01
1
1
)1/()1/(1)1/(1
1
1
2
<−Ε−+×
−

 −−=∂
∂ −−−−−−+−
εθ
αµµα
α
µ
ααααααα
α
mm
ANNbC IIIIIIIII
I
   . (11) 
Since ( ) αµ −−1 1II  is larger than ( ) ααµ −+−12II  for 10 << α , the whole term is always 
negative. Accordingly, domestic consumption declines as the prices for foreign 
intermediates rise. More importantly, the smaller a country’s currency is relative 
to the size of the key currency area, the less monetary policy stimulates the econ-
omy. Since we are especially interested in this relationship, we compute the sec-
ond partial derivatives of individual domestic consumption with respect to mone-
tary policy/mark-up prices of foreign intermediates and with respect to the relative 
size of the currency union:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )[ ] 01
1
1
)1/()1/(1)1/(1
1
1
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−

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∂ −−−−−−+−
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IIII
I
    . (12) 
Apparently, the stimulating effect of monetary policy autonomy declines when the 
key currency area expands. Governments may nevertheless continue to utilize 
monetary policy instruments in the presence of a neighbouring monetary union. 
The price tag attached to stimulating the economy, however, becomes larger after 
other countries agree to a unified monetary policy. Once a currency union is es-
tablished, governments of non-member countries either realize a smaller macro-
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economic effect of interest-rate cuts or have to accept higher inflation rates. Over-
all, an increase in the size of the key currency (caused by the formation of a cur-
rency union) makes monetary policy for outside countries more costly. In other 
words: De facto monetary policy autonomy declines when the size of the key cur-
rency area increases. 
 
3. The Effect of Currency Unions on the Monetary Policy of Outsiders: 
Empirical Analysis 
We test the hypotheses derived from the formal model by analysing the influence 
of the EMU on EU members abstaining from the European Currency Union and 
later the Euro (Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark) and on two EFTA countries 
(Norway, Switzerland). Before examining the implication of our model in-depth, 
we demonstrate the validity of the underlying assumption. Again, our argument 
postulates that the size of the key currency area influences the impact of a change 
in the real interest differential. If this did not hold, our theory would rest on a 
wrong assumption and testing the main hypothesis would make little sense.  
In a second step we employ panel GARCH models to directly estimate the effect 
of changes in the key currency area’s interest rate on the interest rates of the 
countries outside the union. Since daily data is not available for our control vari-
ables, we examine monthly data. Our sample spans the time from 1973 to 2002. 
The first year of observation is of limited importance; changes in the first consid-
ered data-point do not alter the results.  
To investigate the external effects of a currency union systematically, we examine 
the determinants of the discount rate („the rate at which the central banks lend or 
discount eligible paper for deposit money banks“) and the lending rate („the rate 
that usually meets the short- and medium-term financing needs of the private 
sector“). In particular, we analyze discount rate adjustments in the cases of the 
Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden and lending rates in the 
cases of Great Britain and Switzerland. Because information on both interest rates 
is available for Germany, it was possible to regress discount rates on discount 
rates and lending rates on lending rates. Under this condition, we were unable to 
observe parameter heterogeneity between the two subsets of countries.  
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Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the central bank interest rates for the 
five countries included in our sample and for Germany: 
 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Obs. Period 
discount rates 
GER 4.596 8.750 1.950 1.804 357 73:01 - 02:09 
DNK 7.251 13.000 2.750 2.553 356 73:01 - 02:08 
NOR 8.556 17.000 4.500 2.544 357 73:01 - 02:09 
SWE 6.891 12.000 1.000 2.975 355 73:01 - 02:07 
lending rates 
GER 10.347 15.440 7.270 1.952 305 77:05 - 02:09 
GBR 9.378 17.000 4.000 3.208 356 73:01 - 02:08 
CHE 5.471 7.990 3.800 1.133 261 81:01 - 02:09 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Central Bank Interest Rates 
Though lending rates are higher than discount rates, we were unable to detect a 
systematic effect in the regression analyses. Our results are therefore robust in the 
operationalization of the central bank interest rate.6   
 
The Effect of Changes in the Interest Rate Differential on the Exchange-Rate  
We start with a test of the assumption that the effect of changes in the interest rate 
differences on the exchange-rate increases with the size of the key currency area. 
This test is necessary, because we are not aware of research relating exchange-rate 
effects to interest-rate differentials and the relative sizes of currency areas.  
Neither have pre-tests indicated the existence of serial and cross-sectional hetero-
scedasticity, nor were usual statistical tests able to detect autocorrelation.7 The 
absence of these common econometric plagues allows us to run a simple panel 
regression of exchange rate adjustments to Germany and the Eurozone on changes 
of interest rate differences with Germany (model 1) and the interest rate changes 
of the outsider countries (model 2). Our assumptions are valid if the observed 
effect is larger after the establishment of the ECU. Table 2 depicts the results: 
 
                                                 
6  We used simple sample split methods and more complex interaction effect specifications 
to test the dependency of our results on the type of interest rates reported by the central 
banks. We found no systematic effect. Results can be obtained from the authors upon 
request. 
7  Test statistics will be provided upon request 
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dependent variable: 
changes of exchange rate with 
Germany /EURO 
Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 0.004 
(0.001)*** 
0.004 
(0.001)*** 
Changes in interest rate differences 
)( geri rrd − , 73-94 
0.002 
(0.003) 
 
Changes in interest rate differences 
)( geri rrd − , 94-02 
0.026 
(0.008)**** 
 
Changes in interest rate of outsider 
countries ( )ird , 73-94 
 0.0001 
(0.003) 
Changes in interest rate of outsider 
countries ( )ird , 94-02 
 0.035 
(0.009)**** 
prob.<F 0.003 0.000 
N 1628 1679 
Table 2: Dependence of the exchange rate on interest rate differences before and 
after 1994   
 
Table 2 provides ample evidence in support of our assumption. The effect of 
changes in the interest rate difference on the exchange rate is significantly more 
pronounced in the second period than in the first period. This result is robust and 
does not depend on whether changes in interest rate differences or changes in in-
terest rate levels are used as regressors. The relationship between interest rates 
and exchange rates, upon which our model crucially relies, can easily be found in 
real world data. This clearly allows us to proceed with empirically testing of the 
main hypothesis derived from our model.  
 
Results from Panel GARCH Estimation in Differences 
To test our main theoretical assertion of an increase in the extent to which the 
monetary policy of the key currency area influences the interest rate of 
neighbouring countries, we run a panel GARCH model. Interest rates are usually 
driven by stochastic processes (that is: they have a single unit root), it is therefore 
recommended to take the first difference. By looking only at changes of the real 
interest rates, we reduce the available cross-sectional variance, but at the same 
time we get rid of the differences in levels resulting from different types of central 
bank interest rates and eliminate non-stationarity in the data. Unit roots render the 
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estimated coefficients of time series models in levels inefficient and can even lead 
to spurious regression results. In our case, this is almost warranted, because our 
dataset includes far more time-points than cross sectional observations (countries). 
Most importantly, the procedure is also theoretically plausible, since we are inter-
ested in short term adjustments rather than in long-term effects. Consequently, we 
employ real interest rates (central bank interest rate minus the inflation rate) to 
eliminate noisy short-term variations in the inflation rate.  
The variance of the dependent interest rates reveals time-dependency, thus vio-
lating one of the Gauss-Markov assumptions of linear regression models. Not 
controlling for variance heterogeneity would render estimates biased and ineffi-
cient though still consistent (Wooldridge 2003: 416). For this reason, we run 
Panel-GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) mod-
els, which do not only estimate the usual mean equation of linear models but also 
specify a variance equation. While the conditional mean function estimates the 
expected values of the endogenous variable with respect to our theoretical in-
spired exogenous variables (the German interest rate, domestic inflation, growth 
etc.), the variance equation controls for time-dependency of the endogenous vari-
able’s variance by regressing the variance of the endogenous variable on the 
lagged values of the squared residuals (ARCH-term) plus the lagged values of the 
forecasted variance (GARCH-term).  
We regress real interest rate changes of Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Swit-
zerland, and Norway on the real interest rate changes of the key currency (Ger-
many/ Eurozone). Our theory finds support if the outsiders’ monetary policy fol-
lows the real interest rates of the Eurozone more closely than it followed Ger-
many’s interest rate before the establishment of the Euro. We therefore estimate 
the slopes of our main variable for two (model 3), or respectively for four (model 
4) periods. The cuts in the time-series have been specified for basically two pur-
poses: The first reason is substantive: In July 1990, the EMU countries fully liber-
alized capital accounts vis-à-vis each other and enforced their monetary policy 
coordination. In January 1994, central banks of the EMU began to coordinate and 
harmonize interest rate policies more closely. At the same time, the European 
System of Central Banks was legally introduced. Finally, in January 1999, the 
EMU countries fixed their exchange-rate and introduced the Euro. The second 
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reason is methodical: The earlier a unified ‘key currency area’ is assumed to come 
into existence, the stronger the test to our theory. The later the cut is set, the easier 
it is to find support for our theory.8  
We control for the growth of GDP and the level of the real interest rate in the 
countries under observation as well as for the German growth rate and changes in 
the exchange rate. These variables are likely to influence the central bank interest 
rate, but are unlikely to be correlated with the main variables of interest. Thus, the 
exclusion of controls is possible in principle, though this would render the results 
less convincing. To further investigate the robustness of our findings, we report 
results from a model that controls for unit fixed effects. As some authors specu-
late, unit fixed effects might control for not explicitly modelled country specific 
time invariant variables (like institutions). Neither the inclusion or exclusion of 
control variables nor the inclusion of N-1 country dummies has substantial effects 
on the estimated coefficients of our theoretically interesting variables.  
Table 3 reports all regression results in the GARCH(1,1) specification. The stan-
dard errors are displayed in parentheses. 
 
                                                 
8  We also ran the regressions excluding the period of the German unification 90-94. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the inclusion/exclusion of these years does not alter the results. 
  
Dependent variable: 
changes of real interest 
rates of non-EMU 
countries 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Mean Equation:       
Intercept 
 
-0.087  
(0.017) **** 
-0.087 
(0.017) **** 
-0.087 
(0.017) **** 
-0.110 
(0.027) **** 
-0.090 
(0.018) **** 
-0.116 
(0.039) *** 
Level of Real Interest Rate 
(GB, DNK, SWE, CHE, 
NOR) 
0.032 
(0.004) **** 
0.032 
(0.004) **** 
0.032 
(0.004) **** 
0.033 
(0.004) **** 
0.033 
(0.004) **** 
0.033 
(0.004) **** 
Change in Interest Rate 
Germany, 73-94 
0.234 
(0.024) **** 
 0.234  
(0.024) **** 
0.229 
(0.025) **** 
0.231 
(0.025) **** 
0.230 
(0.025) **** 
Change in Interest Rate 
Germany 94-02 
0.311 
(0.082) **** 
 0.310 
(0.083) **** 
0.319 
(0.095) **** 
0.309 
(0.082) **** 
0.312 
(0.082) **** 
Change in Interest Rate 
Germany, 73-90 
 0.210 
(0.051) **** 
    
Change in Interest Rate 
Germany, 90-94 
 0.251 
(0.026) **** 
    
Change in Interest Rate 
Germany, 94-99 
 0.304 
(0.112) *** 
    
Change in Interest Rate 
Germany, 99-02 
 0.317 
(0.119)*** 
    
Growth     0.005 
(0.008)  
  
Growth Germany    0.006 
(0.011) 
  
Change in Exchange-Rate   0.060 
(0.227) 
0.042 
(0.233) 
  
FE Sweden      0.020 
(0.047) 
  
FE Denmark      0.041 
(0.042) 
FE Switzerland      0.016 
(0.051) 
FE Norway      0.050 
(0.047) 
MA 1 ( )1−tε      0.022 
(0.030) 
 
       
Variance Equation:       
Intercept 0.019 
(0.001) **** 
0.019 
(0.001) **** 
0.019 
(0.001) **** 
0.021 
(0.001) **** 
0.019 
(0.001) **** 
0.019 
(0.001) **** 
ARCH 1 ( )2 1−tε  0.161 (0.013) **** 0.160 (0.013) **** 0.161 (0.013) **** 0.159 (0.013) **** 0.163 (0.013) **** 0.162 (0.013) **** 
GARCH 1 ( )2 1−tσ  0.825 (0.009) **** 0.826 (0.010) **** 0.825 (0.009) **** 0.824 (0.010) **** 0.823 (0.009) **** 0.824 (0.010) **** 
N 1628 1628 1628 1587 1628 1628 
Wald chi²  
(Prob > chi²) 
231.40 
(0.000) 
241.81 
(0.000) 
233.33 
(0.000) 
231.58 
(0.000) 
235.63 
(0.000) 
246.44 
(0.000) 
Log likelihood -1601.132 -1601.016 -1601.114 -1583.370 -1600.860 -1600.288 
****p<=0.001; ***p<=0.01; **p<=0.05; *p<=0.1 
Table 3: Pooled GARCH First Differences Models. Dependent variable: Change in Real Interest Rate 
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Table 3 supports our theoretical model. Changes in the key currency’s interest rate 
have the assumed significant and positive effect on the decision of the EMU-out-
siders to adjust their interest rates. This holds true for the whole period under ob-
servation. Most noteworthy, the effect increased significantly after the EMU cen-
tral banks had harmonized their interest rates. Between 1973 and 1994 the five 
countries under observation shifted their real interest rate up by approximately 
0.23 percentage points for every percent real interest increase by the German 
Bundesbank. In the period following the introduction of close monetary coordina-
tion between EMU central banks, the corresponding value was 0.31 percentage 
points. These results are robust across different model specifications. Hence, the 
influence of the key currency on the monetary policy of EMU outsiders is posi-
tively related to the size of the key currency area. Ironically, monetary policy 
autonomy – the main reason for abstaining from the union – decreases even in 
countries that abstained from joining the union.  
Both, the growth rate of the countries in our sample and the German growth rate, 
appear to be positively related to the real interest rate differentials. However, al-
though central banks apparently observe the macroeconomic situation in the key 
currency area, the estimated effect is rather small and never becomes significant.  
The estimation of the variance equation reveals the necessity of controlling for 
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity. Both, the ARCH 1 and the GARCH 
1 terms remain positive and significant in all models we ran. Obviously, interest 
rates are not only highly volatile over time, the variance at time t also depends on 
the variance at t-1. Ignoring this fact would have rendered estimates inefficient 
and most likely biased. Since the sum of the ARCH and the GARCH terms fall 
short of unity, our estimates conform to the stability condition for ARCH models.9 
Finally, after having taken first differences and controlled for ARCH the remain-
ing residuals are white noise. 
To sum up: the empirical tests of the crucial assumption and of the implications of 
the model both lend support to our theoretical claims. De facto monetary auton-
omy of countries outside the European monetary union declined as a consequence 
                                                 
9  Values greater than one could again lead to spurious estimates since the ARCH process 
would be explosive. 
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of the harmonization of central bank policies in the EMU and – more importantly 
– as a consequence of the Euro introduction.  
4. Conclusion 
The ability of governments (and independent central banks) to set the prime inter-
est rate according to the macroeconomic situation of the country is conditioned 
upon the degree of international monetary interdependence. The more important 
international production chains become, the more vulnerable countries are to ex-
change-rate volatility. As a consequence, governments increasingly have to rely 
upon one instrument – monetary policy – to reach two goals simultaneously: sta-
ble growth and stable exchange rates.  
This paper advances our understanding of the role of currency unions for mone-
tary policy autonomy in neighbouring countries. In particular, the exchange rate 
goal becomes more important for a country, the larger the size of the key currency 
area gets. Of course, significant changes in the relative size of key currency areas 
tend to be rare and moderate. But there is one exception to this rule: the formation 
of a currency union. If a nucleus of countries forms a new currency union, outsid-
ers will experience a sudden increase in the need to stabilize exchange-rates. The 
de facto monetary policy autonomy therefore declines with the introduction of a 
currency union incorporating the former (regional) key currency. Nowadays, the 
prime interest rate of West European countries more closely follows the monetary 
policy agreed upon by the European Central Bank.  
This novel perspective on monetary policy autonomy finds support in the data. 
Evidence for our theoretical claims is persuasive: The impact of monetary policy 
in the Eurozone on monetary policy in Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Norway 
and Switzerland, is about 25 percent higher than it was before the introduction of 
the Euro. However, despite having lost some monetary policy autonomy after the 
introduction of the Euro, this decline remains incomplete. Only the future can tell 
whether the decline is already far-reaching enough to render joining the union 
viable for outside countries.  
If our model correctly mirrors the real world and if governments consider the effi-
ciency gains of free trade, political leaders in countries outside (but geographi-
cally and economically close to) the currency union face three options: First, they 
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may largely ignore the reduction of their monetary policy autonomy and stay out-
side the currency union. Countries are most likely to do so if trade with the union 
appears relatively unimportant, their business-cycle is only loosely synchronized 
with the union’s cycle, exogenous shocks are frequent and domestic financial 
markets efficient. Second, governments may decide to join the union if the ex-
pected gains from joining exceed the loss in monetary policy autonomy. This op-
tion hinges on the degree to which governments have employed monetary policy 
autonomy as a strategic instrument in the past. If constituents have an anti-infla-
tion bias and value low inflation rates relative to high consumption levels, gov-
ernments are more likely to join the union. Finally, outsiders may institutionalize 
a competing currency union. This option seems preferable to groups of outsiders 
that already have closely synchronized business cycles.  
Most likely, the expansion of a currency union in general and the Eurozone in 
particular will be stopped by insiders, not by outsiders. Old members of a cur-
rency union may have no interests in accepting membership applications even if 
outsiders are willing to give up their monetary autonomy. Accordingly, the opti-
mal number of currencies will never approach one. With a growing heterogeneity 
of currency union members, a single country’s political influence on the Union’s 
monetary policies declines. Membership in a currency union becomes potentially 
more costly, the more members the union already has accepted. The political rep-
resentation of each single country declines and political conflict intensifies with 
the desynchronization of the member’s business cycles and thus with the number 
of members. This logic places a natural ceiling on the size of currency unions. 
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